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Standing Room Only: Solving the Injury-in-Fact 
Problem for Data Breach Plaintiffs 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If something valuable is taken from you without your permission, 
does it matter who took it? According to modern data privacy law, it 
does. In fact, the answer to that simple question may end your case 
before it even begins. 
Consider the examples of two people who had their valuable 
personal data taken from them by an unauthorized third party.1 Person 
1 enrolled in a cell phone plan with a major phone company and was 
required to give the phone company some of his private information, 
such as his credit card number, phone number, and home address. 
Person 2 started working for a company, and was required to give her 
employer her personal information, such as her name, address, Social 
Security number, date of birth, and bank account number.2 Neither 
Person 1 nor Person 2 thought much about these transactions, 
assuming that the companies would take reasonable steps to protect 
their personal information. 
Later, Person 1 discovered that his phone company had been 
giving “metadata”3 about his (and many other people’s) phone calls 
to the government.4 The phone company had been giving out this 
data every day for the past five years or more.5 The information given 
to the government was not inherently sensitive—it was not Person 1’s 
financial information or the contents of his calls. The government had 
only collected information about the calls, such as which numbers 
Person 1 had called, how often he had made those calls, and how long 
 
 1. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40 (3d Cir. 2011); Am. Civil Liberties 
Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 801 (2d Cir. 2015) [hereinafter ACLU]. 
 2. See Reilly, 664 F.3d at 40. 
 3. Metadata is “data that describes and gives information about other data,” 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (2015), or “[s]econdary data that organize, 
manage, and facilitate the use and understanding of primary data.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 4. See ACLU, 785 F.3d at 801. 
 5. See id. at 796. 
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he had spent on each call.6 All of this data collection occurred without 
Person 1’s knowledge or permission.7 
Person 2 discovered that a hacker broke into the network where 
her employer stored her personal data and gained access to the 
database where Person 2’s personal information was stored.8 Person 2 
was told that the hacker may have stolen Person 2’s credit card 
number, name, home address, bank account number, and even Social 
Security number.9 
Concerned about the loss of their personal data, both Person 1 
and Person 2 filed lawsuits. Person 1 chose to sue the government for 
taking his information,10 while Person 2 sued her company for 
negligence in protecting her financial information.11 
When Person 1 and Person 2 appeared in court, they were 
immediately faced with a question that may have surprised them. Both 
courts began with the same threshold inquiry: did you suffer an 
injury?12 In other words, Person 1 was asked whether he was harmed 
when the government collected his phone call metadata without his 
permission. Likewise, Person 2 was asked whether she was harmed 
when a hacker gained access to her personal financial information. The 
answers to these questions had a much larger impact than either 
plaintiff may have expected. 
The court, upon hearing Person 1’s claim, determined that he had 
suffered an injury, and could therefore bring his case before the 
court.13 However, the court hearing Person 2’s claim determined that 
she had not actually suffered an injury at all, and therefore could not 
bring her claim.14 Even though Person 1’s compromised information 
was only metadata, and Person 2’s compromised information included 
her financial information and Social Security number, Person 1 was 
able to receive redress from the courts, while Person 2 was barred. 
 
 6. See id. 
 7. See id. at 795–96. 
 8. See Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 9. See id. 
 10. ACLU, 785 F.3d at 787. 
 11. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 38. 
 12. See id. at 41–42; ACLU, 785 F.3d at 800. 
 13. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 40–42. 
 14. See id. at 42. 
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In the current legal environment, two people can have their 
personal data compromised in similar ways, yet have their claims 
treated in completely different manners. If the plaintiffs’ personal 
information is accessed by the government, even if the information 
accessed is simply metadata, they are allowed to present their case in 
court.15 But if their personal data is accessed by a private third party, 
no matter how sensitive the information may be, they may not get a 
chance at redress.16 
This apparent discrepancy stems from the doctrine of “standing” 
contained in Article III of the United States Constitution.17 According 
to the current interpretation of the standing doctrine, many 
consumers in private data breach actions have not suffered a sufficient 
injury-in-fact to qualify for standing, and are therefore unqualified to 
bring an action in court.18 Because of this procedural hurdle, many 
data breach plaintiffs have been forced to resort to creative theories to 
qualify for standing—the most common of which is that the data 
breach will increase the likelihood of a potential future injury. In other 
words, plaintiffs claim that although they have not yet suffered harm, 
they are certain to be harmed in the imminent future. 
This theory has been met with limited success,19 and often creates 
as many problems as it purports to solve. By focusing on potential 
future injuries, rather than the unauthorized access itself, courts task 
themselves with predicting the future, instead of focusing on a present 
controversy. Unsurprisingly, this emphasis on injury has resulted in 
inconsistency and confusion in the judicial system. 
The standing doctrine issue in the private data breach context has 
been discussed by many scholars, who have proposed various theories 
to try to make it easier for consumers to qualify under the standing 
doctrine. Some have recommended that the legislature enact a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme to govern data security.20 Others 
 
 15. ACLU, 785 F.3d at 800. 
 16. See, e.g., Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42. 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Caroline C. Cease, Note, Giving Out Your Number: 
A Look at the Current State of Data Breach Litigation, 66 ALA. L. REV. 395, 398–404 (2014). 
 18. See, e.g., Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42. 
 19. See infra Section III.B. 
 20. See Amanda C. Border, Note, Untangling the Web: An Argument for Comprehensive 
Data Privacy Legislation in the United States, 35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 363 (2012); 
Tanith L. Balaban, Comprehensive Data Privacy Legislation: Why Now Is the Time?, 1 CASE W. 
RES. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 1, 34 (2009); Exec. Office of the President, ADMINISTRATION 
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have suggested a relaxation of some of the requirements of the 
standing doctrine.21 Still others have proposed the adoption of a new, 
probability-based concept of injury-in-fact.22 
This Comment suggests that such comprehensive action is not 
necessarily required to address the problem of standing in private data 
breach cases. Instead, this Comment suggests that courts recognize a 
right to privacy for individual personal data. If courts recognize that 
individuals should have a reasonable right to data security, they can 
eliminate the need for courts to try to predict the future. This 
recognition would allow courts to focus on present controversies, 
rather than potential future harms. 
The Comment goes on to explain how courts can more effectively 
apply the standing doctrine in private data breach cases by adopting 
the injury-in-fact standard established by the United States Supreme 
Court in Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA.23 This standard has proven its 
workability in the recent Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper case in 
the Second Circuit.24 These two cases show that the Supreme Court 
has already created a standard in the data security area that effectively 
balances plaintiffs’ right to be heard with constitutional standing 
doctrine limitations. The only missing piece required to apply this 
standard is recognition of a legal right to privacy for data held by a 
third party. If the law were to recognize this right, either by legislation 
or judicial decision, the standards in Amnesty Int’l USA and ACLU 
would easily establish a framework for analyzing the injury-in-fact 
requirement in private data breach settings. 
Part II of this Comment outlines the standing doctrine’s injury-
in-fact requirement, and explains how the requirement has limited the 
 
DISCUSSION DRAFT: CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF RIGHTS ACT OF 2015, 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/cpbr-act-of-2015-
discussion-draft.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2016). 
 21. Miles L. Galbraith, Identity Crisis: Seeking A Unified Approach to Plaintiff Standing 
for Data Security Breaches of Sensitive Personal Information, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1365 (2013) 
(recommending a relaxation of the requirement that a future injury be “imminent” if it is to 
qualify as injury in fact); Adam Lamparello, Online Data Breaches, Standing, and the Third-Party 
Doctrine, 2015 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 119 (2015) (same). 
 22. See Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing’s Expected Value, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1283 (2013) 
(proposing that courts calculate the expected value of a future injury when analyzing to find 
injury-in-fact). 
 23. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013) [hereinafter Amnesty 
Int’l USA]. 
 24. See ACLU, 785 F.3d at 800–03. 
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ability of consumers to bring private data breach claims. Part III then 
demonstrates how plaintiffs have turned to more creative theories to 
show injury-in-fact, particularly the potential-future-injury theory. It 
also shows how the judiciary’s focus on this theory has resulted in an 
unclear, inconsistent standard in private data breach cases. Lastly, Part 
IV demonstrates how recognizing a legal right to privacy for personal 
data held by a third party can resolve the injury-in-fact issues facing 
data breach plaintiffs and allow courts to better focus on current 
controversies rather than potential future harms. It concludes by 
showing how the standard set by the United States Supreme Court in 
Amnesty Int’l USA can be applied in private data breach cases to 
effectively balance consumers’ rights with constitutional 
justiciability limitations. 
II. STANDING AND THE INJURY-IN-FACT REQUIREMENT 
Plaintiffs in data breach claims often find themselves arguing 
issues involving the United States Constitution at the very start of 
litigation.25 Article III of the United States Constitution limits 
federal judicial power to the resolution of “Cases” and 
“Controversies.”26 From this language, the United States Supreme 
Court has established a set of rules that limit a plaintiff ’s ability to 
bring a claim.27 These rules are often called the justiciability doctrine, 
 
 25. See Cease, supra note 17, at 398–404. 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 27. James Leonard & Joanne C. Brant, The Half-Open Door: Article III, the Injury-in-
Fact Rule, and the Framers’ Plan for Federal Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 
1, 2 (2001). 
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which includes concepts such as ripeness,28 mootness,29 political 
questions,30 and standing.31 
The aspect of justiciability that arises most often in data breach 
claims is the standing requirement.32 If a plaintiff cannot demonstrate 
that she has standing to bring a claim, a court will dismiss the case 
before reaching the merits.33 To meet the standing requirement, a 
plaintiff must show: 1) that she has suffered an “injury-in-fact,” 2) 
that the injury is traceable to the defendant, and 3) that the requested 
relief will redress the injury.34 The first standing requirement—
“injury-in-fact”—is usually the justiciability hurdle that data breach 
plaintiffs have the most difficulty in overcoming.35 To sufficiently 
demonstrate injury-in-fact, a plaintiff must show an injury that is 
“concrete and particularized,” or “actual or imminent,” and that is 
not “conjectural or hypothetical.”36 In other words, a plaintiff must 
prove that he has a personal stake in the litigation by “show[ing] that 
he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result 
of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.”37 
 
 28. Ripeness “seeks to separate matters that are premature for review.” ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 92 (3d. ed. 2009). There is some overlap between 
ripeness and the injury requirement in standing doctrine, but ripeness is perhaps best understood 
as a question of when courts can grant pre-enforcement review of a statute or regulation. Id.; see 
also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 161 (1987). 
 29. The mootness doctrine requires that the controversy be live at all points of the 
litigation, not just the outset. For example, if a criminal defendant dies during an appeal, the 
case becomes moot. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at 97; see also Steffel v. Thompson, 415 
U.S. 452, 459 n.10 (1974). 
 30. The political question doctrine refers to the rule that some questions should be left 
to the political branches of government, rather than heard by the court. See CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 28, at 103; see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). 
 31. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, at 45–46. 
 32. Timothy H. Madden, Data Breach Class Action Litigation – A Tough Road for 
Plaintiffs, 55 BOS. B.J. 27, 29 (2011). 
 33. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741 (1972) (“As we conclude that the 
Court of Appeals was correct in its holding that the [plaintiff] lacked standing to maintain this 
action, we do not reach any other questions presented in the petition, and we intimate no view 
on the merits of the complaint.”). 
 34. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. 
Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). 
 35. See Galbraith, supra note 21, at 1376. 
 36. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (holding that a plaintiff in 
an environmental case lacked standing to challenge certain environmental regulations). 
 37. Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979); see also Leonard & 
Brant, supra note 27, at 2. 
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Usually, plaintiffs can easily demonstrate injury-in-fact by pointing 
to a physical or financial harm. In most cases where a plaintiff alleges 
one of these types of damage, courts do not even address the injury-
in-fact requirement. The injury is so obvious to each party that the 
question is not disputed. The United States Supreme Court has also 
recognized that, even when a plaintiff does not have physical or 
financial harm, congressional actions can create individual legal rights 
that qualify a plaintiff for the injury-in-fact requirement.38 If one of 
these legislatively created rights is violated, it “can confer standing to 
sue even where the plaintiff would have suffered no judicially 
cognizable injury in the absence of statute.”39 The same principle 
applies to constitutionally created rights. 
But even when a plaintiff does not have a legislative or 
constitutional right, and cannot show a physical or financial harm, 
she still may be able to qualify for the injury-in-fact requirement.40 
Courts have often recognized injury-in-fact in cases where, in 
absence of a financial harm, plaintiffs allege an abstract, intangible, 
or even “spiritual” injury.41 For example, plaintiffs have qualified 
for standing without showing a physical or financial harm in actions 
for trespass, defamation, breaches of contract, and loss of 
recreational opportunities.42 
 
 38. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n. 3 (1973) (“Congress may enact 
statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury 
would exist without the statute.”). 
 39. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975). 
 40. F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. 
REV. 275, 281 (2008). 
 41. Galbraith, supra note 21, at 1377. 
 42. See Hulle v. Orynge, Y.B. 6 Edw. 4, fol. 7, Mich, pl. 18 (1466), reprinted in A.K.R. 
KIRALFY, A SOURCE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 128–32 (1957) (trespass); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 
424 U.S. 448, 460 (1976) (defamation); Foley v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 772 F.3d 63, 77 (1st 
Cir. 2014) (breach of contract); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 
528 U.S. 167 (2000) (loss of recreational opportunities). In many of these cases, courts have 
not only held that the plaintiffs do qualify under the injury-in-fact requirement even without 
physical or financial harm, but have often awarded nominal damages to the plaintiffs. See, e.g., 
75 Am. Jur. 2d Trespass § 112 (“In the absence of proven or actual damages, plaintiffs are 
entitled to nominal damages in an action for trespass. The limited right to recover nominal 
damages in an action for trespass to real property is appropriate when needed to protect an 
important right, even absent any substantial loss or injury.”); see also THEODORE SEDGWICK, A 
TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES ch. VI, §§ 96–109, at 164–91 (Arthur G. Sedgwick 
& Joseph H. Beale eds., 9th ed. 1920) (listing hundreds of cases awarding nominal damages for 
violations of non-economic rights). 
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However, most courts in data breach cases have been hesitant to 
recognize the loss of personal data as the same kind of justiciable 
“intangible injury” recognized in trespass actions.43 These courts often 
insist that the loss of personal data by itself is not enough to qualify as 
injury-in-fact.44 Courts usually ask data breach plaintiffs to show that 
their data was not only stolen, but also misused in a way that resulted 
in additional, economic damage.45 
This insistence upon economic damage causes problems for many 
data breach plaintiffs. In many cases, consumers who have had their 
personal information accessed bring claims against companies soon 
after they learn about the data breach—often before a third-party 
hacker uses the information to attempt identity theft or credit card 
fraud.46 Thus, many data breach plaintiffs are turned away for lack of 
standing and are therefore unable to present the merits of their claims. 
Faced with this difficulty in establishing injury-in-fact, 
consumers have developed increasingly creative theories to overcome 
the obstacle. Some courts have accepted these creative theories,47 
perhaps recognizing some injustice in requiring a consumer to wait 
patiently for his information to be used against him before he is 
allowed to bring a claim. However, many other courts have been 
hesitant to recognize these more creative methods of qualifying for 
the injury-in-fact requirement.48 
 
 43. Galbraith, supra note 21, at 1379. 
 44. See, e.g., Forbes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 420 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1020–21 (D. 
Minn. 2006). 
 45. Galbraith, supra note 21, at 1379. It is also possible that the “third-party doctrine” 
has an influence on courts in data breach cases. The third-party doctrine states that when a 
person voluntarily gives information to a third party, the person foregoes any privacy rights he 
has in that information. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); see also Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Though the third-party doctrine has never been 
explicitly raised in a data breach case, since it was created and has been discussed almost 
exclusively in the context of 4th amendment searches and seizures, see, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The 
Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 561 (2009) (defending the third party 
doctrine and analyzing cases where it has been applied), some commentators have suggested 
that the third-party doctrine is one of the reasons that courts are hesitant to grant standing to 
data breach victims. See Lamparello, supra note 21, at 120. 
 46. See Cease, supra note 17, at 399. 
 47. See infra Section III.B. 
 48. John L. Jacobus & Benjamin B. Watson, Clapper v. Amnesty International and Data 
Privacy Litigation: Is a Change to the Law “Certainly Impending”?, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 3, 
27 (2014). 
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III. CONSUMER ATTEMPTS TO QUALIFY FOR STANDING 
Consumers have asserted many different theories of injury-in-fact 
in their struggle to overcome the hurdle posed by the standing 
requirement. These theories range from a theory of injury through 
emotional distress to a theory of breach of implied contract.49 But 
perhaps the most common theory of injury that data breach plaintiffs 
have come to rely on is the theory of potential-future-injury. 
A. The Potential-Future-Injury Theory 
The potential-future-injury theory is based on the idea that, 
though an event has not caused injury to the plaintiff yet, it has 
increased the risk of an injury occurring in the future. Possibly the 
most common use of this theory has been outside of data breach 
settings, in cases involving environmental protection, such as Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife50 and Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw.51 The 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in these decisions has framed much of the 
debate in other potential-future-injury cases, including many private 
data breach cases. 
In the frequently cited Lujan case, an environmental organization 
challenged new regulations that changed the effect of the Endangered 
Species Act.52 The new regulations allowed the federal government to 
avoid certain statutory obligations for projects outside of the United 
States.53 One plaintiff, a member of an environmental organization, 
claimed that the new regulations “w[ould] seriously reduce 
endangered . . . species habitat” in areas that she had previously 
visited.54 The plaintiff claimed that she had suffered an injury-in-fact 
because she “intend[ed] to return to [the foreign habitats] in the 
future.”55 The U.S. Supreme Court was not convinced by this 
theory—especially after one plaintiff admitted that she did not have 
current plans to visit the habitat, because it was in the middle of a 
 
 49. Id. at 28–30, 55, 60. 
 50. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 51. 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
 52. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 563. 
 55. Id. 
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country embroiled in a civil war.56 The Court held that “‘some day’ 
intentions—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed any 
specification of when the some day will be” were not sufficient to 
establish standing.57 
The Lujan decision did not put a stop to environmental claims 
based on abstract theories of potential future injury-in-fact. Eight 
years later, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Servs. 
(TOC), Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court again faced a case involving 
environmental harm, and this time the Court came to a different 
conclusion.58 In Friends of the Earth, an environmental organization 
sued Laidlaw for discharging excessive amounts of pollutants into a 
river.59 The organization claimed injury-in-fact on the theory that the 
pollution had limited local residents’ ability to use the river for 
recreation.60 For example, one member of the organization stated that  
he lived a half-mile from Laidlaw’s facility; that he occasionally drove 
over the . . . [r]iver, and that it looked and smelled polluted; and that 
he would like to fish, camp, swim, and picnic in and near the river 
between 3 and 15 miles downstream from the facility, as he did when 
he was a teenager, but would not do so because he was concerned 
that the water was polluted by Laidlaw’s discharges.61  
The Court stated that these kinds of “conditional statements” could 
not be equated with the “speculative ‘some day’ intentions” in Lujan, 
 
 56. Id. at 563–64. 
 57. Id. at 564. But see id. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the plaintiffs did 
have standing since “[a]n injury to an individual’s interest in studying or enjoying a species and 
its natural habitat occurs when someone . . . takes action that harms the species and habitat.”); 
id. at 592 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asserting that plaintiffs did have standing since a fact finder 
could conclude, based on the plaintiffs “statements of intent to return, . . . past visits to the 
[habitats], as well as their professional backgrounds, that it was likely that [the plaintiffs] would 
make a return trip to the [habitats].”). 
 58. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
 59. Id. at 176. 
 60. Id. at 181–83. 
 61. Id. at 181–82 (The other members of the organization made similar statements. 
One member stated that she no longer picnicked, walked, or birdwatched near the river out 
of concerns about pollutants. Another attested that her home had a lower value than similar 
homes located farther from Laidlaw’s facility.); see also id. at 183 (Another member averred 
that he had canoed downriver from the facility, and would like to canoe closer, but would not 
because of the pollutants.). 
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and held that the Friends of the Earth members did meet the injury-
in-fact requirement.62 
These two cases laid out the principles of the potential-future-
injury theory. The Supreme Court realized that recognizing all 
potential future injuries as injuries-in-fact could unduly expand the 
power of federal courts.63 To address this concern, the Court limited 
the theory’s applicability to injuries that are “actual or imminent,” and 
not merely “hypothetical.”64 The theory was then picked up by private 
data breach plaintiffs in their efforts to overcome the injury-in-fact 
hurdle created by the standing doctrine. However, many courts have 
been hesitant to recognize injury-in-fact for data breach plaintiffs that 
rely on a potential-future-injury theory of harm. 
B. The Potential-Future-Injury Theory in Private Data Breach Claims 
Plaintiffs with private data breach claims usually advance the 
potential-future-injury theory using two arguments. First, plaintiffs 
contend that the unauthorized access to their personal data has 
increased the likelihood that they will suffer financial damage in the 
future, such as by identity theft or fraudulent charges on their bank 
accounts.65 As a corollary to this theory, plaintiffs sometimes also 
argue that they have suffered current financial harm because they 
have spent money trying to mitigate future injuries, such as by 
 
 62. Id. at 184. 
 63. Hessick, supra note 40, at 297; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
560–61 (1992). 
 64. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560; see 
also Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 66 (1986) (rejecting standing based on “unadorned 
speculation”); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983) (denying standing to 
an individual seeking to challenge police chokehold because it was only speculative that the 
plaintiff would be subjected to chokehold); Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 171–72 n.2 
(1977) (denying standing in a claim challenging police use of deadly force against a person 
attempting to escape arrest); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974) (denying 
standing to residents who sought injunctive relief against judges allegedly engaged in a pattern 
and practice of discriminatory practices on the ground that the threat to plaintiffs from this 
discrimination was only “speculation and conjecture”); Golden v. Zwickler 394 U.S. 103, 109 
(1969) (denying standing for a claim based on the potential future candidacy of a former 
Congressman); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89–91 (1947) (stating that a 
“hypothetical threat [of enforcement] is not enough” for jurisdiction); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. 
Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489 F.3d 1279, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (denying 
standing for claim of speculative future injury), modified on reh’g by 513 F.3d 234 (D.C. 
Cir. 2008) (per curiam). 
 65. Jacobus & Watson, supra note 48, at 28. 
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purchasing credit monitoring services.66 While other plaintiffs have 
advanced alternative theories of harm, such as emotional damage67 
or breach of implied contract,68 the potential-future-injury theory 
has been the most common.69 
Circuit courts have come to different conclusions in the 
application of these two theories to private data breach cases. For 
example, in 2011, the Third Circuit addressed the potential-future-
injury theory in Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.70 In Reilly, a hacker infiltrated 
Ceridian’s computer system, which held the personal and financial 
information of up to 27,000 employees at 1,900 companies.71 The 
personal data included names, addresses, Social Security numbers, 
dates of birth, and bank account information.72 Neither the plaintiffs 
nor Ceridian Corp. knew for certain whether the hacker actually read, 
copied, or used the personal data.73 After the breach, Ceridian Corp. 
sent letters to notify the employees of the event, and arranged for one 
year of free credit monitoring and identity theft protection.74 
Even though Ceridian Corp. voluntarily offered credit monitoring 
and protection, some employees filed suit against the company. To 
establish injury-in-fact, the employees relied on the potential-future-
injury theory, claiming that they suffered an increased risk of identity 
theft because of the data breach.75 The Third Circuit, however, held 
that the employees’ “string of hypothetical injuries” did not meet the 
injury-in-fact requirement.76 Specifically, the court noted that the 
employees could not show that the hacker actually read the 
 
 66. Id. at 16–17. 
 67. Id. at 46–47. The plaintiffs in both Reilly v. Ceridian Corp. and a similar case, Krottner 
v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010), asserted the emotional distress theory of 
injury. The Krottner court, which had accepted the “potential future harm” theory, also accepted 
the emotional distress contention, while the Reilly court, which did not accept the “potential 
future harm” argument, also rejected the plaintiff’s emotional distress argument. Id. at 1142; 
Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 45–46 (3d. Cir. 2011). 
 68. Jacobus & Watson, supra note 48, at 37–39; see also Katz v. Pershing, 672 F.3d 64, 
72 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that a breach-of-contract theory could establish injury-in-fact). 
 69. Jacobus & Watson, supra note 48, at 17. 
 70. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 38. 
 71. Id. at 40. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 44. 
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information, or that the hacker intended to misuse the data. Because 
“there [was] no evidence that the intrusion was intentional or 
malicious,” the potential future harm was not sufficiently imminent to 
qualify as injury-in-fact.77 
Though the Third Circuit did not find injury-in-fact in Reilly, 
other circuits have found injury-in-fact when applying the same 
potential-future-injury test in a similar data breach situation. For 
example, in 2007, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the 
potential-future-injury theory in Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp.78 In 
Pisciotta, banking customers alleged that Old National Bancorp failed 
to adequately secure their personal information.79 The plaintiffs 
claimed the bank suffered a security breach, and the plaintiffs’ 
information was accessed by a third party.80 The plaintiffs whose data 
had been accessed did not claim to have suffered any “completed direct 
financial loss to their accounts,” or claim that they were victims of 
identity theft.81 Instead, they claimed to have suffered “substantial 
potential economic damages,” and added that they had incurred 
expenses to mitigate the potential-future-injury.82 The Seventh Circuit 
accepted these facts as sufficient to qualify the plaintiffs for the injury-
in-fact requirement.83 In doing so, the Seventh Circuit stated the 
plaintiffs qualified for the injury-in-fact requirement because “[e]ven 
a small probability of injury is sufficient to create a case or 
controversy—to take a suit out of the category of the hypothetical.”84 
 
 77. Id. The Third Circuit apparently envisioned a possibility that a third-party hacker 
could either unintentionally penetrate a company’s firewall to gain access to personal employee 
information, or would intentionally do so, but for non-malicious reasons. 
 78. Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 79. Id. at 631. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 632 (emphasis in original). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 632, 634. 
 84. Id. at 634 n.4 (citing Elk Grove Vill. v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
The Seventh Circuit also noted that in other areas of tort law such as toxic tort and medical 
malpractice, “a cognizable injury for standing purposes” is created even when exposure to toxic 
substances or defective medical devices only increase the risk of future harm. See e.g., Pisciotta, 
499 F.3d at 634 n.3 (citing Denney v. Deustche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 264–65 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(toxic tort); Sutton v. St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc., 419 F.3d 568, 574–75 (6th Cir. 2005) (defective 
medical device); Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947–48 (9th Cir. 
2002) (environmental tort); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 
F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (environmental tort)). 
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In 2010, the Ninth Circuit also accepted the potential-future-
injury theory of injury-in-fact in Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.85 In 
Krottner, a laptop containing the names, addresses, and Social Security 
numbers of 97,000 employees was stolen from a Starbucks store in 
Washington.86 Starbucks informed the affected employees of the theft 
and offered a year of credit watch services so that employees could 
monitor for identity theft.87 Two employees filed a lawsuit against 
Starbucks over the incident.88 Both employees alleged that after 
receiving the letter, they spent “a substantial amount of time” 
monitoring their 401(k) and bank accounts to prevent identity theft.89 
One of the plaintiffs was notified by his bank that someone had tried 
to open a new account using his Social Security number, but that the 
bank closed the account; the plaintiff suffered no financial loss.90 The 
Ninth Circuit court held that because there was a “credible threat of 
real and immediate harm stemming from the theft,” the plaintiffs 
qualified under the injury-in-fact requirement.91 
These cases illustrate the different results that courts can reach 
when faced with largely similar data breach fact patterns. In 
Krottner, the Ninth Circuit found injury-in-fact when a third party 
stole a laptop with a plaintiff ’s financial data.92 And in Pisciotta, the 
Seventh Circuit did find injury-in-fact when a third party breached 
a bank’s network and accessed the plaintiff ’s financial data.93 Yet in 
Reilly, the Third Circuit did not find injury-in-fact when a hacker 
infiltrated a company’s network and accessed a plaintiff ’s personal 
and financial data.94  
 
 85. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1140 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 1141. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 1143. 
 92. Id. at 1140. 
 93. Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 631 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 94. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40 (3d. Cir. 2011). 
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C. Difficulty and Inconsistency in Applying the Potential-Future-
Injury Theory 
The results in these data breach cases illustrate the difficulties and 
inconsistencies that invariably arise when courts apply the potential-
future-injury theory. Circuits that have addressed the theory have 
often come to opposing results, even in situations with similar fact 
patterns.95 Circuit courts have applied the test in similar factual 
scenarios, and have reached completely different results. 
This inconsistency arises because applying the potential-future-
injury test requires courts to peer into the future to determine how 
likely it is that a future risk will actually occur. Not only does this 
approach result in inconsistent results, it also arguably stretches the 
doctrine of standing farther than the Constitution intended.96 
Recognizing all potential future risks seems to contradict the idea that 
justiciable claims must be based on a “case[]” or “controvers[y].”97 
Instead of analyzing what has happened already, the theory requires 
courts to decide if something will happen in the future. 
These inconsistent results have caused uncertainty in the law 
surrounding private data breach claims.98 As noted above, some 
circuits seem to be more lenient when applying the potential-future-
injury theory than others. As yet, courts have not established a 
uniform test for applying the potential-future-injury theory in data 
breach cases that achieves consistent results.99 Overall, the potential-
future-injury theory stretches the case or controversy concept to 
unrecognizable limits, asks courts to predict the future, and achieves 
inconsistent results—the theory is not a reliable way to govern private 
data breach cases in a modern, digital age. 
 
 95. See Galbraith, supra note 21, at 1369 n.22. 
 96. See Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Given the multiple 
strands of speculation and surmise from which the plaintiff’s hypothesis is woven, finding 
standing in this case would stretch the injury requirement past its breaking point.”); Patricia 
Cave, Giving Consumers a Leg to Stand on: Finding Plaintiffs a Legislative Solution to the Barrier 
from Federal Courts in Data Security Breach Suits, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 765, 784 (2013) 
(arguing that allowing an increased risk of harm to qualify as standing in all data breach cases 
would “[s]tretch[] the [d]octrine to [i]ts [l]imits”). 
 97. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 98. Jacobus & Watson, supra note 48, at 29. 
 99. Cease, supra note 17, at 421. But see Jacobus & Watson, supra note 48, at 29 
(analyzing case law to identify some common factors used by courts in resolving the injury-in-
fact issue). 
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IV. A SIMPLE SOLUTION TO THE PRIVATE DATA BREACH PROBLEM 
The standing doctrine, particularly the injury-in-fact requirement, 
has hindered the goals of both consumers and courts in private data 
breach cases. Obviously, consumers are inconvenienced when they are 
barred from bringing an action when a third party steals their personal 
data. Consumers must choose between bringing a claim before their 
personal data is used against them (which involves litigating a 
threshold constitutional issue), or waiting for their data to be misused 
before bringing the action. 
The standing doctrine also puts courts in an uncomfortable 
situation. Because plaintiffs can only prove injury-in-fact through the 
potential-future-injury theory, courts are required to engage in 
guesswork to determine whether a future injury is a “credible threat 
of real or immediate harm”100 or a mere “string of hypothetical 
injuries.”101 Courts addressing this theory must attempt to foresee the 
future, which is precisely the activity that the “cases and controversies” 
language in the Constitution is designed to prevent. 
A. Proposed Methods of Addressing the Problem 
Many commentators have attempted to solve the standing 
problem for private data breach claims. Their solutions have ranged 
from comprehensive data security legislation,102 to relaxing the 
requirement that an injury be imminent,103 to recognizing the 
“expected value” of potential future financial harm as sufficient to 
meet injury-in-fact.104 These solutions could help clarify the law 
surrounding injury-in-fact, but none of them are an instant cure-all. 
Some may introduce as many problems as they solve, and all of the 
proposals would likely be complicated to adopt. These complications 
have meant that, so far, courts have been hesitant to adopt any of 
these solutions. 
Many scholars have called for Congress to step in and regulate the 
area of data security, stating that “more comprehensive federal 
 
 100. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 101. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 44 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 102. Galbraith, supra note 21; see Cave, supra note 96, at 789. 
 103. See Lamparello, supra note 21. 
 104. See Nash, supra note 22. 
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legislation is necessary to protect consumers from cybersecurity 
threats.”105 The first proposed solution—comprehensive federal 
legislation—would be the most all-encompassing way to deal with the 
problem. Comprehensive legislation would establish individual 
privacy rights, and could also provide a unique standard for courts to 
use when addressing whether a plaintiff has standing to bring a claim. 
Even the executive branch has called for legislation to be enacted, first 
by publishing an executive report calling for Congressional action,106 
and then proposing a bill of its own that would establish 
comprehensive regulatory change.107 As yet, however, no federal 
legislation has been enacted, leaving only a “constantly changing 
patchwork of state laws.”108 
While comprehensive legislation in this area of law may be the 
ideal solution, there is no telling when or if federal legislation will be 
enacted. Bills intended to regulate data security have been proposed 
to both houses of Congress since at least 2006.109 Currently, there are 
numerous bills before the 114th session of Congress that seek to 
regulate data security on a large scale.110 However, most of the bills 
from previous years did not make it past the committee stage, and as 
of yet, none of the current bills have passed a House or Senate vote.111 
Moreover, many of the bills that have been proposed would not 
address the standing issue for many data breach plaintiffs even if they 
were enacted. Generally, the bills do not focus on recognizing an 
 
 105. Galbraith, supra note 21, at 1375. 
 106. Exec. Office of the President, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: 
A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL 
DIGITAL ECONOMY (2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf. 
 107. Exec. Office of the President, supra note 20. 
 108. Julie A. Heitzenrater, Data Breach Notification Legislation: Recent Developments, 4 
I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 661, 663 (2009). 
 109. See, e.g., Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 4127, 109th Cong. (2006); Data 
Security Act of 2007, H.R. 1685, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 110. See, e.g., Secure Data Act of 2015, S. 135, 114th Cong. (2015); Secure Data Act of 
2015, H.R. 726, 114th Cong. (2015); Data Security Act of 2015, S. 961, 114th Cong. (2015); 
Data Security Act of 2015, H.R. 2205, 114th Cong. (2015); Data Security and Breach 
Notification Act of 2015, H.R. 1770, 114th Cong. (2015); Data Security and Breach 
Notification Act of 2015, S. 177, 114th Cong. (2015); Secure and Protect Americans’ Data Act, 
H.R. 4187, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 111. The furthest along at the time of writing are House Bill 2205, and House Bill 
1770, which were sent to the House for consideration on December 9, 2015 and April 15, 
2015 respectively. 
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individual right against unauthorized access to data, but instead focus 
on requiring companies to notify individuals if their information has 
been subject to unauthorized access.112 Even if one of the notification-
focused bills were enacted by Congress, it would only give individuals 
a claim if their data was accessed and the company did not notify them 
of the breach; it would not give an individual the right to pursue a 
claim based on the breach alone. A federal act of this type would not 
necessarily help the plight of data breach victims, since many states 
already have notification laws in place.113 
The second proposed solution to solve the data breach standing 
problem is to retain the potential-future-injury theory, but relax the 
requirement that harms must be imminent to qualify as injury-in-
fact.114 Scholars that make this suggestion generally agree with the 
concept of the potential-future-injury theory, but argue that courts 
have been too strict in their insistence that a future injury must be 
impending.115 Proponents of this method typically make the same 
arguments that were used in the opinions in Krottner and Pisciotta, 
reasoning that if the future-injury framework is good enough for toxic 
exposure, medical defect, and environmental cases, then it should also 
work for data breach cases.116 While adopting this approach may better 
protect individual consumers’ rights, it would not solve many of the 
problems that currently afflict the potential-future-injury theory. 
Retaining the potential-future-injury framework would still 
require courts to predict the future by forcing them to consider a 
possible future occurrence instead of allowing them to focus on a 
present “controversy.” Courts would probably still come to 
inconsistent results, even if the standard is relaxed.117 Retaining the 
future-injury standard would not eliminate the difficulty courts have 
had in applying the standard—it would only move the goalposts, not 
change the rules of the game. Keeping the potential-future-injury 
standard, even in a relaxed form, would probably result in a legal 
environment that is just as muddied as it is today. 
 
 112. See Heitzenrater, supra note 108, at 676; see also H.R. 1770; S. 177. 
 113. Michael E. Jones, Data Breaches: Recent Developments in the Public and Private 
Sectors, 3 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 555, 574 (2008). 
 114. Galbraith, supra note 21, at 1387; Lamparello, supra note 21, at 128. 
 115. Galbraith, supra note 21, at 1387. 
 116. Id. at 1388–96. 
 117. See supra Section III.C. 
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A third proposed solution is for courts to adopt an “expected 
value” model of analyzing future injuries.118 Jonathan Nash, in his 
article, Standing’s Expected Value, argues that courts should resolve 
the standing question by deciding whether a plaintiff has suffered a 
harm with a positive “expected value.”119 This value would be 
calculated by multiplying the probability of a future harm by its likely 
magnitude.120 If the value of that calculation “would be sufficient to 
support standing were it to arise as a typical ‘actual harm,’” then the 
plaintiff’s damage would qualify as injury-in-fact.121 
This alternative method of analyzing injury-in-fact would be a 
unique way to solve the future-injury issue. On first glance, it would 
give courts a clear, numerical way to calculate whether a potential 
future harm qualifies. However, this method would actually worsen 
the problem in other ways. The “expected value” method would still 
require courts to predict the future, rather than focus on present 
controversies. But in addition to the future-gazing that courts do now, 
they would also need to quantify both the magnitude of any potential 
harm, and its probability of occurring. Though Nash contends that 
courts routinely quantify similar risks when setting bail or a 
preliminary injunction,122 those quantification processes differ from 
the proposed method for quantifying data breach claims. For example, 
to set bail, one of the factors courts use is a defendant’s financial 
circumstances.123 Having a certain, established figure to start from 
undoubtedly makes the process of setting bail much easier. With the 
“expected value” method, courts would not have the benefit of 
starting from a set figure, but would have to speculate to create both 
the magnitude of possible damages and the probability of the damages 
occurring. Applying such an uncertain method without any concrete 
starting point would probably result in the same inconsistency and 
uncertainty that plagues data breach victims today.124  
 
 118. See Nash, supra note 22, at 1306. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 1316–19. 
 123. 18 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2D 149. 
 124. See supra Section III.C. 
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B. A Simpler Solution 
Most of the solutions posited by scholars and policymakers would 
require either comprehensive legislation, or a completely new judicial 
standard. However, there is a simple, easy solution that would better 
apply the standing doctrine with only minimum changes to the 
current law. This solution is possible because a workable standard has 
already been established—in the specific setting of unauthorized 
access to personal data—by the United States Supreme Court.125 Not 
only has the Supreme Court established the relevant standard, the 
standard has also already been applied by a Circuit Court in a similar 
case.126 This ready-made standard already exists, more closely follows 
the standing requirement, and would be much easier to apply than the 
current uncertainty of the potential-future-injury theory. 
1. The injury-in-fact standard in government cases 
Two recent cases, Amnesty Int’l USA127 and Am. Civil Liberties 
Union v. Clapper,128 created a workable injury-in-fact standard that 
could easily be used by courts to analyze private data breach actions. 
The standard has already proven effective in preventing frivolous data 
breach claims, while still allowing plaintiffs who have experienced an 
actual loss to have their day in court. 
The Supreme Court case that established the standard was 
Amnesty Int’l USA.129 In Amnesty Int’l USA, the Supreme Court ruled 
on a constitutional challenge to a 2008 amendment to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).130 FISA was originally enacted in 
1978 to regulate government electronic surveillance for foreign 
intelligence.131 In 2007, prompted by a perceived need to combat 
terrorism, the Executive branch of the U.S. Government asked 
Congress to amend the FISA to expand the government’s authority 
to use electronic surveillance.132 Congress obliged by enacting the 
 
 125. See Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013). 
 126. See ACLU, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 127. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. at 1138. 
 128. 785 F.3d at 787. 
 129. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. at 1138. 
 130. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, § 101 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. 
 131. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. at 1143. 
 132. Id. at 1144. 
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FISA Amendments Act of 2008,133 which “established a new and 
independent source of intelligence collection authority, beyond that 
granted in traditional FISA.”134 
After the amendments were enacted, Amnesty International USA, 
an organization of human rights activists, sued James R. Clapper, the 
Director of National Intelligence, claiming that the new amendment 
violated the constitutional protections against illegal search and 
seizure in the Fourth Amendment.135 The activists sought an 
injunction against Clapper to prohibit him from ordering electronic 
surveillance under the newly amended act.136 To address the issue of 
injury-in-fact, the activists claimed that because their work required 
them “to engage in sensitive international communications with 
individuals who they believe are likely targets of surveillance,” they 
were particularly sensitive to future government surveillance.137 
Therefore, the activists claimed they had suffered injury-in-fact when 
the amendment was passed, since the amendment created “an 
objectively reasonable likelihood” that their communications would 
be intercepted by the government in the future.138 The activists also 
argued that, in the alternative, they had suffered injury-in-fact because 
they had undertaken “costly and burdensome measures to protect the 
confidentiality of their international communications.”139 
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, disagreed with both of the 
activists’ theories.140 The Court stated that, even if the amendment 
made the possibility of future surveillance more likely, such a future 
possibility was too speculative to meet the injury-in-fact 
 
 133. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2008); Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, § 702, 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (2008). 
 134. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. at 1143; 1 DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, 
NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS & PROSECUTIONS §§ 3.1, 3.7 (2d ed. 2012). The 
amended version of the statute allowed the government to start surveillance without 
demonstrating probable cause that the target was a foreign power. It also did not require the 
government to specify the nature and location where the surveillance would take place. 
 135. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. at 1142. The Fourth Amendment protects U.S. 
citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures. See generally WAYNE R. LEFAVE, SEARCH 
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (5th ed. 2012). 
 136. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. at 1142. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 1143. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 1142. 
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requirement.141 Instead of an “objectively reasonable likelihood” of 
future injury, the Court reiterated that the correct standard was 
whether the threatened injury was “certainly impending.”142 In 
rejecting the first theory of injury, the Court stated that the theory 
was too speculative to satisfy the requirement that an injury be 
“certainly impending.”143 The Court also rejected the activists’ second 
theory of injury-in-fact, stating that the activists were not allowed to 
“manufacture standing by choosing to make expenditures based on 
hypothetical future harm that [was] not certainly impending.”144 
The Amnesty Int’l USA decision is not the only time this injury-
in-fact standard has been applied to unauthorized government access 
to data. In an even more recent decision, published in May 2015, the 
Second Circuit was faced with a similar situation to the one that 
confronted the Supreme Court two years earlier.145 The case, Am. 
Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, was another challenge to government 
surveillance.146 Though the fact patterns were largely similar, the 
Second Circuit distinguished the ACLU plaintiff ’s situation from that 
of the plaintiffs in Amnesty Int’l USA.147 Because of that distinction, 
the Second Circuit court held that the ACLU plaintiffs did have 
injury-in-fact, and were thus able to reach Article III standing.148 
ACLU v. Clapper involved a challenge to the government’s 
ability to collect data about American citizens under the USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001.149 Prior to the enactment of the Patriot Act, 
the government was allowed to order certain common carriers 
(including telephone companies) to provide business records to the 
government whenever there were “specific and articulable facts 
giving reason to believe that the person to whom the records 
pertain[ed] [wa]s a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”150 
 
 141. Id. at 1141. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 1147 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (U.S. 1990)). 
 144. Id. at 1143. 
 145. ACLU, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 801–02. 
 148. Id. at 802. 
 149. See USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, § 215, 115 Stat. 287. 
 150. ACLU, 785 F.3d at 795; see also Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, 
Pub. L. No. 105–272, § 602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2410–11 (1998). 
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However, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001151 expanded the 
government’s power to not only collect “business records,” but also 
“any tangible things.”152 The amendments also eliminated the 
restrictions on the types of businesses the government orders could 
reach.153 Lastly, the amendments loosened the requirements from 
requiring “specific and articulable facts” that give reason to believe 
that the person is a foreign agent, to requiring only a showing that 
there are “reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things 
sought are relevant to an authorized investigation.”154 
Using this expanded power, the government initiated a program 
to collect data for foreign surveillance purposes.155 Under the 
program, the government ordered telephone companies to provide 
them “call detail records or ‘telephony metadata.’”156 Though this 
“metadata” did not include the contents of the phone calls themselves, 
it did include information that could be considered sensitive and 
private.157 The government program, which began in 2006, collected 
 
 151. See USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, § 215, 115 Stat. 287. 
 152. ACLU, 785 F.3d at 795. 
 153. Id. The current statute allows the collection of “any tangible things (including books, 
records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to obtain foreign intelligence 
information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism 
or clandestine intelligence activities.” 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1). 
 154. ACLU, 785 F.3d at 795; 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A). 
 155. ACLU, 785 F.3d at 795. 
 156. Id.; see also Emily Berman, Quasi-Constitutional Protections and Government 
Surveillance, 2016 BYU L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 5) (discussing how the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court attempted to limit, as much as it could, the 
government’s bulk collection of telephone metadata). 
 157. See id. at 793–94. Telephony metadata is not the contents, or voice conversations, of 
phone calls themselves, but rather details about phone calls. In one of the government orders 
that was contested in this case, “telephony metadata” was defined as “including but not limited 
to session identifying information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone number, 
International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI) number, International Mobile 
Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers, and 
time and duration of call.” In re F.B.I. for an Order Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things from 
Redacted, 2013 WL 5741573, at *1 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013). This information can be used 
to identify specific devices and users. Then, paired with information about the length of a call, 
and the number that the user called, it can reveal private information. For example, the 
government could use the information to discover that a user has called a suicide hotline, alcohol 
addiction recovery hotline, HIV testing service, or phone-sex service. See Brief for Experts in 
Computer and Data Science, as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants, ACLU, 785 F.3d 787 (No. 
14-42), 2014 WL 1118041 at *5–9. 
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information from all calls made both within the United States, and 
between the United States and abroad.158 
The plaintiffs in ACLU claimed that the government practice of 
collecting metadata in bulk, and “on an ongoing daily basis,” was not 
within the scope that Congress authorized in the Patriot Act 
amendments.159 Before the Second Circuit could decide the ultimate 
issue of whether the program was authorized by statute, however, it 
had to address the threshold question of whether the plaintiffs had 
Article III standing.160 
The Second Circuit held that the ACLU plaintiffs had alleged 
sufficient injury to establish Article III standing.161 Unlike in Amnesty 
Int’l USA, where the plaintiffs “had not established standing because 
they could not show that the government was surveilling them,”162 the 
ACLU plaintiffs’ claims “require no speculation,” since they had 
already “presented evidence that their data [we]re being collected.”163 
Therefore, the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs did have injury-
in-fact, and eventually held that the government program was not 
within the Patriot Act’s authorized scope.164 
Taken together, these two cases create a clear, workable standard 
of addressing injury-in-fact in an unauthorized data-access setting. 
According to the Amnesty Int’l USA standard, if plaintiffs can show 
that a third party actually accessed their data, the harm is concrete 
enough to qualify as injury-in-fact because it “requires no 
speculation.”165 The ACLU plaintiffs met this requirement because the 
government admitted that it had copied the plaintiff ’s data from the 
phone companies’ records and conducted searches through the 
database containing the plaintiff’s information.166 On the other hand, 
if plaintiffs cannot show that a third party actually accessed their 
personal data, the harm is too speculative to qualify for the injury-in-
fact requirement. The Amnesty Int’l USA plaintiffs could not meet this 
 
 158. ACLU, 785 F.3d at 797. 
 159. Id. at 792. 
 160. Id. at 800. 
 161. Id. at 801. 
 162. Id. (quoting Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148–50 (2013)). 
 163. ACLU, 785 F.3d at 801–02. 
 164. Id. at 802, 821. 
 165. ACLU, 785 F.3d. at 801–02. 
 166. Id. at 802. 
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standard since they were only contesting the amendment to FISA.167 
They did not allege that the government had actually used the 
amended FISA to access their personal information.168 
The courts in these two cases had a much different discussion 
about the standing doctrine and the injury-in-fact requirement than 
courts in private data breach cases.169 In Amnesty Int’l USA and 
ACLU, instead of speculating on whether unauthorized access to data 
could cause some uncertain future harm, the courts asked a 
straightforward question—had the government actually stolen the 
plaintiffs’ data, or not?170 Asking this question effectively balances the 
two competing interests behind the data privacy debate. The Amnesty 
Int’l USA standard distinguishes frivolous, unnecessary claims, where 
the claimants’ personal data has not actually been accessed (like the 
claim in Amnesty Int’l USA), from the reasonable claims where 
personal data has been accessed (similar to that in ACLU).  
The Amnesty Int’l USA standard applies the constitutional 
doctrine of standing without requiring courts to speculate on 
potential future harms. Courts can address present facts instead 
of using their time to calculate the probability of an uncertain, 
future event.  
2. Applying the government standard to private data breach cases 
Amnesty Int’l USA and ACLU created a strange dynamic in data 
privacy law. The two cases recognized that plaintiffs could meet the 
injury-in-fact requirement if the government accessed their personal 
information—even if that information was only metadata. And yet, in 
private data breach cases such as Reilly, the legal system is often 
unwilling to recognize that a plaintiff can reach injury-in-fact if a 
private party accesses personal information—even if that information 
includes sensitive financial data.171 This discrepancy seems awkward 
and even unfair—to a person who has had his data stolen, it may seem 
 
 167. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. at 1148. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Compare id. at 1146–49, and ACLU, F.3d at 801–03, with Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 
664 F.3d 38, 40 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 170. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. at 1148; ACLU, 785 F.3d at 801. 
 171. See supra Introduction. 
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that courts care more about who stole his information, than what kind 
of information was stolen. 
Fortunately, the solution to this unusual discrepancy does not 
require comprehensive change. Instead, the discrepancy can be 
resolved by using the standard established by Amnesty Int’l USA in 
private data breach actions. Admittedly, some courts in private data 
breach cases have already discussed the Amnesty Int’l USA decision.172 
However, the standard’s translation to private cases has been uneasy. 
Some of the courts using the standard in private cases have claimed 
that the “certainly impending” language affects the law of standing, 
while others claim that it does not change the rule.173  
The reason that the Amnesty Int’l USA standard has been an 
uneasy fit in private cases—and the missing link to its effective use—is 
that individuals currently have a statutory right against government 
collection of data, but do not have a statutory right against private 
collection of data. In an ideal world, legislatures would solve this 
problem by creating a statutory right to reasonable data security 
against third party hackers. Legislatures would not necessarily have to 
create the kind of comprehensive scheme that many scholars have 
envisioned—they could simply create the right, and formally adopt the 
Amnesty Int’l USA injury-in-fact standard to efficiently apply the 
standing doctrine.  
Even if legislatures do not create a statutory right to reasonable 
data security, courts may recognize the principle as a common-law 
right—just as past courts recognized a previously unknown common-
 
 172. See infra note 173. 
 173. See Jacobus & Watson, supra note 48, at 82–93. Some courts have used Amnesty Int’l 
USA’s language to dismiss private data reach claims, implying that the opinion may have 
strengthened the requirement that potential future harms be imminent. See In re Barnes & 
Noble Pin Pad Litigation, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125730, at *7–12 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 3, 2013); 
Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871, 875–79 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 2014); 
Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 651–57 (S.D. Ohio 2014). Other 
courts have cited to the Amnesty Int’l USA holding, but still found injury-in-fact, implying (and 
sometimes stating outright), that the Amnesty Int’l USA opinion did not change the law of 
standing in any significant way. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th 
Cir. 2015); In re Sony Gaming Networks and Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, 996 
F. Supp. 2d 942, 960–63 (S.D. Cal. 2014); Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc., No. 14 C 561, 2014 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96588, at *14–16 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014); In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy 
Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1221–24 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2014). Overall, it is clear that the 
inconsistency and uncertainty around private data breach cases has continued. 
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law right to privacy in tort law.174 The recognition of this right would 
make it easy to apply the efficient, clear Amnesty Int’l USA standard 
to private cases. 
Recognition of this right is the missing link to allow courts to 
comfortably apply the Amnesty Int’l USA standard. If plaintiffs could 
show that a third party has already accessed or collected their personal 
data (for example, by showing attempted draw on an account or the 
theft of a laptop), they would qualify for the injury-in-fact 
requirement. On the other hand, if plaintiffs did not claim that a third 
party had actually accessed or collected their data, they would not 
satisfy the injury-in-fact standard. 
The application of the Amnesty Int’l USA standard to private 
cases would eliminate the need for the difficult and speculative 
potential-future-injury theory. By applying this standard, courts 
could better focus on present “cases” and “controversies,” rather 
than searching for hypothetical future injuries.175 They would be 
better equipped to handle a modern, digital age where people have 
to give personal information to third parties on a daily basis—
instead of trying to fit the square pegs of pre-digital standards into 
the round hole of modern reality. 
Some may argue that the recognition of an individual right to 
privacy in data breach cases would result in too much litigation over 
consumer data breaches. Such a concern may be valid if courts were 
to recognize an unlimited right to privacy without adopting any 
standards for discerning between frivolous claims and valid ones. 
But the ACLU decision already demonstrated that the Amnesty 
Int’l USA standard is capable of discerning between serious and 
frivolous claims.176  
Even if the recognition of a right to data security results in an 
increase in data breach litigation, the increase would be a reasonable 
price to pay if it also increased individual consumer’s protection 
against unauthorized access to sensitive personal data. The American 
 
 174. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 
193 (1890) (arguing for a private right of privacy); Marks v. Jaffa, 26 N.Y.S. 908, 909 (Super. 
1893) (an early case that recognized the right to privacy, or that “now the right to life has come 
to mean the privilege to enjoy life without the publicity or annoyance of a lottery contest waged 
without authority”). 
 175. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 176. See supra Section IV.B.1. 
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legal system has already proven that it can enforce individual data 
privacy rights in certain industries, such as healthcare,177 as long as 
courts have a workable standard for dividing the reasonable claims 
from the unreasonable. As long as recognition of the right also came 
with a workable standard for eliminating frivolous claims, such as the 
Amnesty Int’l USA standard, U.S. courts should be able to handle the 
claims. Also, many other countries—particularly those in Europe—
already have widespread information privacy rights, and have been 
able to enforce those rights without adverse consequences to their 
legal systems.178 The Amnesty Int’l USA standard would create a way 
to strengthen individual privacy rights without causing an 
unreasonable rise in new data breach claims. 
Recognizing a right to protection against unauthorized access to 
personal data, and combining that right with the standard in Amnesty 
Int’l USA, would allow courts to more closely follow the “cases and 
controversies” language established by the U.S. Constitution.179 This 
method of determining standing would allow courts to address what 
has happened, rather than requiring them to predict what may happen. 
Courts should not be asked to predict the future, but should be able 
to focus on the allegations already before them. And, as evidenced by 
the different results in Amnesty Int’l USA and ACLU, the injury-in-
fact standard established by the Supreme Court can differentiate 
between plaintiffs that meet the injury-in-fact requirement and 
plaintiffs that do not. The Amnesty Int’l USA standard is flexible and 
strong enough to find the proper balance in determining which suits 
can be brought. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The current legal landscape is contradictory when it comes to 
protecting a consumer’s right to data security. The current law allows 
plaintiffs to bring claims if they have lost data to the government. But 
 
 177. See Kevin B. Davis, Privacy Rights in Personal Information: HIPAA and the Privacy 
Gap Between Fundamental Privacy Rights and Medical Information, 19 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 535, 536–537 (2001); The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d–1320d-9 (1996); The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x (1970). 
 178. See Ryan Moshell, Comment, . . . and Then There Was One: The Outlook for a Self-
Regulatory United States Amidst a Global Trend Toward Comprehensive Data Protection, 37 TEX. 
TECH L. REV. 357, 368–69 (2005). 
 179. See Galbraith, supra note 21, at 1385–87. 
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if they lose data to a private party—even if that data is more sensitive—
they often are not allowed to bring their case in court.  
This discrepancy is an unintended consequence of the standing 
doctrine being applied to the digital world. The unwillingness to 
recognize a right to privacy in personal data creates a substantial 
hurdle for consumers in private data breach cases to overcome. In 
response to these doctrines, consumers have turned to creative 
theories of injury to qualify under the injury-in-fact requirement. 
These theories, which often require courts to predict the future, are 
difficult for courts to apply with any degree of consistency. 
These problems of applying the standing doctrine to private data 
breach cases have been discussed by multiple scholars, who have 
recommended myriad methods of resolving the issue. However, many 
of these suggestions would be difficult for courts to adopt and apply, 
and some would still require courts to predict the future. Instead of 
adopting a complicated solution, the problem can be resolved simply 
by recognizing a legal right to reasonable protection of data given to 
third parties in private transactions. If courts recognize this right, they 
can apply a body of precedent that already deals with unauthorized 
data collection—the standard established and applied in Amnesty Int’l 
USA and ACLU. 
By adopting this simple solution, consumers would get a fair 
chance to bring actions in court if they have their data stolen in a data 
breach. However, the standard established in Amnesty Int’l USA and 
ACLU would also be stringent enough to block frivolous claims when 
consumers cannot show that their data has been stolen. This standard 
would allow courts to address private data breach claims fairly, without 
a need to predict the probability of a potential future harm. 
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